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Introduction 
Environmental policy makers use life cycle assessment (LCA) to 
reduce scientific uncertainties about the environmental impact of 
technologies and products. However, the structure of the U.S. policy-
making system often acts as a roadblock to the use of LCA outputs in 
decision making. Over the past two decades/life cycle assessment has 
had limited impact in determining U.S. environmental policy, either 
as a specific quantitative indicator or as a general outlook toward 
the environment. In this chapter, I discuss specific characteristics 
of the U.S. political system, which often make uncertainty-reducing 
assessments like life cycle assessment fail in a decision-making 
context: the incremental nature of the U.S. policy-making system; the 
Emerging Technologies; Socia-Behavioral Life Cycle Approaches 
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place-based nature of environmental politics in the United States; and 
the uncertainties associated with most environmental and scientific 
challenges. These three essential components of environmental 
policy-making in the United States pose inherent challenges to the 
use of life cycle assessment perspectives in policy debates. 
We cannot look at life cycle assessment or any other 
environmental decision tool in a vacuum. The effectiveness of such 
tools hinges on the way they interact with the political context in 
which environmental decisions are made. To maximize the practical 
relevance of tools such as LCA, we must tailor them to suit the real 
world of environmental politics. In this chapter, I attempt to explain 
the limited scope of LCA in US policy-making by taking a look at 
the unique benefits of LCA outputs and then viewing these against 
the backdrop of the u.s. environmental policy-making context. In 
doing so, I first present a historical overview of the relationship 
between life cycle assessments and policy-making; next I explain the 
incremental nature of u.s. policy-making, the role of uncertainty in 
the policy-making, and the place-based nature of U.S. policy-making. 
The end of this chapter ties its environmental policy-making lessons 
together with a look at the role oflife cycle assessment in the politics 
of climate change in the United States. 
The purpose of this volume is to consider how we might increase 
the scope and effectiveness oflife cycle assessments. In this volume, 
many authors have indicated some of the technical areas where LCA 
methodology should be refined. I argue that beyond these technical 
alterations, improving the "fit" of life cycle assessment outputs into 
the U.S. policy-making context is an important way to make LCA 
more effective. Without proper appreciation and consideration of the 
constraints posed by tbe relevant political context, the practitioners 
will continue to experience frustration in achieving the necessary 
political relevance of LCA-even as the methodology evolves. 
Methodology and studies should be designed to not only enhance the 
scientific and the technical validity of an LCA but also to maximize 
their political efficacy and the probability that LCA outputs actually 
inform policy debates-both goals are equally important and should 
be pursued simultaneously. 
LCA as a Policy-Making Tool 1219 
LeA as a Policy-Making Tool 
Policy makers often have to make decisions with limited knowledge 
of the environmental impacts of the things they are making decisions 
about. Human activities have many consequences that fall under the 
umbrella of environmental impacts, and it is almost impossible to 
deduce the overall preferability of one set of options over another. 
Policy makers concerned with environmental protection must 
therefore rely upon scientific knowledge produced by tools such 
as life cycle assessment, impact assessment, cost-benefit analysis, 
and risk assessment to minimize uncertainty about products and 
processes and to inform decisions that allow them to implement 
the least environmentally harmful policies. The fundamental feature 
that sets life cycle assessment apart from other techniques is that 
LCA tracks the environmental effects of a product or a process from 
cradle-the resources used to create a product-to grave-the 
waste that results from its disposal, and including the resources 
used during its lifespan (Finnveden, 2000; Ross & Evans, 2002; 
US EPA, 2006). The output of LCA studies is an assessment of the 
environmental impact of a product or a service system over many 
different categories relative to the benefit provided by that system 
(Schenck, 2009). Product or service systems are different aspects of 
human activity, such as generating hydroelectric power, transporting 
goods, disposing waste, etc. We mightwantto know, given two options 
for creating the same benefit and a set of criteria to consider, which 
option we should select. Therefore, LCA outputs can be instrumental 
in evaluating different environmental tradeoffs between alternate 
means of providing a similar good or service. Furthermore, LCA 
outputs are expressed numerically, and this provides ease of 
interpretation for policy makers interested in comparing these 
alternatives (Cowell et aI., 2002, 881). Quantitative outputs allow 
policy makers to analyze the environmental damage of a product 
or a service simply and can allow effective and targeted decisions 
based on environmental criteria. This comprehensibility has proven 
to be one of the major benefits ofLCA in political settings. 
For example, once a particular substance has been targeted as 
harmful or hazardous to human health, LCAs can be used to adopt 
policies that minimize the use of that substance in a given process 
or product (Curran, 1997,42). An example of this can be seen in 
r 
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California, where LCA analyses have been used to minimize the 
leachingofheavy metals from shredder residue in landfills (California 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2007). Shredder residue consists 
of glass, plastics, carpet, and dirt, which remain after discarded 
automobiles and appliances are shredded and the valuable metals 
are collected. California generates approximately 360,000 tons of 
shredder residue each year, wbich ends up in landfills and can leach 
heavy metals into the surrounding environment. These heavy metals 
are harmful because they can contaminate surrounding groundwater 
tables and pollute community's drinking water, posing risks to human 
health. California's Department of Toxic Substance Control used life 
cycle assessment analyses to evaluate three alternatives to landfilling 
to minimize this leaching effect and identified one option-in this 
case, using shredder residue as fuel and mineral inputs into cement 
manufacturing-that emerged as a clear environmental winner 
(Boughton & Horvath, 2006). Specifically, recovery of shredder 
residue for cement manufacturing could save 1 million tons of coal 
from being produced each year in the United States, and the authors 
found that this method provided net environmental benefits across 
all impact categories evaluated in the study (Boughton & Horvath, 
2006). LCA has been used in this way to determine the strategies 
that can be used to minimize a variety of environmental impacts, 
including greenhouse gas emissions related to global warming, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, acidifrcation, photochemical smog, 
eutrophication, human toxicity, ecological toxicity, and resource 
depletion (US EPA, 2001). 
The basic philosophy implicit in LCA is life cycle thinking, which 
considers all environmental impacts of a product or a material across 
its entire lifespan, instead of focusing on one specific impact or one 
stage of use. Today's policies are increasingly viewing environmental 
problems as interconnected challenges that affect air, land, or water 
quality across national borders. While today's environmental policies 
are becoming increasingly proactive, previous environmental 
policy-making was often corrective, or end-of-pipe, focusing on 
regulating selected environmental concerns (air pollution, water 
pollution, etc.) or individual life cycle stages (production, waste 
management, etc.) by applying a last minute technology fix to a 
technological problem. As Curran observes, "such narrow solutions 
run the risk of simply transferring impacts to another stage in the 
life cycle or resulting in little or no overall beneficial effect" (Curran, 
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1997,39). Today's policy makers recognize the interconnectedness 
of environmental challenges, which grow increasingly complex as 
the world's economy integrates. LCA has the potential to aid in the 
institutionalization of a shift toward a more holistic and strategic 
approach to environmental management, because it integrates 
the impacts across time and space (Cowell et a/., 2002, 881). For 
example, when we decide to buy a car, we must consider not only the 
car's effect on local air quality but also its impact as a source of GHG 
emissions, the resources that were extracted to build the car, and 
how the car will impact the environment when it becomes a waste. 
LCA is designed to quantify the entirety of a car's impact and prevent 
environmental policies from merely shifting environmental burden 
from one type of impact to another or from one place to another. A 
report by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US 
EPA) on LCA methodology uses a hypothetical situation to explain 
the advantage of LeA's comprehensiveness: 
An LCA allows a decision maker to study an entire product system, 
hence avoiding the sub-optimization that could result if only a single 
process was the focus of the study. For example, when selecting 
between two rival products, it may appear that Option 1 is better for 
the environment because it generates less solid waste than Option 2. 
However, after performing an LCA, it might be determined that the 
first option actually creates larger cradle-to-grave environmental 
impacts when measured across all the three media (air, water, land) 
(e.g., it may cause more chemical emissions during the manufacturing 
stage). Therefore, the second product (that produces solid waste) 
may be viewed as producing less cradle-to-grave environmental harm 
or impact than the first technology because of its lower chemical 
emissions (Curran, 2006, 3). 
We see three main benefits of LCA versus other types of 
environmental indicators. LCA outputs (1) are able to quantify 
tradeoffs, (2) capture impacts irrespective of place and across 
different localities, and (3) measure impacts over the whole lifespan 
of a product or a service system. It is mainly for these three reasons 
that some experts feel LCA techniques will be instrumental in the 
21st century phase of global environmental policy-making. 
LCA has continually gained momentum as a potential policy 
instrument. Many governmental applications have been found 
r 
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for LCA studies, including product-oriented policies (eco-labeling 
and green purchasing); deposit-refund schemes, including waste 
management policies; subsidies and taxation; and finally, general 
process-oriented policies, like toxic substance management (jensen 
etal., 1997,45). Ross and Evans establish the policy-relevance of an 
LCA, concluding that it "is capable of assessing the trade-off between 
several policy options implemented at various points in the life cycle 
and· .. reveal the policy mix that would lead to the most beneficial 
outcome for the environment" (Ross & Evans, 2002,140). 
On the basis of these perceived benefits, Cowell et al. find that 
especially in European countries, "today [LCA] is increasingly used 
to inform public decision making" (Cowell et aI., 2002, 886). They 
discuss three examples of LCA studies informing policy-making 
at the national and the continental level in Europe: the European 
Commission's Eco-Labeling Scheme set up in 1992, regulations of 
Polyvinyl chloride in packaging in the Netherlands and Sweden in the 
1970s, and the waste management strategies in the UK from 2000. 
More recently, France has gone forward with a policy that requires all 
the products sold in the country to have an environmental product 
declaration, effective 2011 (Schenck, 2009, 2). It is expected that 
LCA studies will provide the informational basis for this particular 
eco-labeling scheme and that other EU member countries will follow 
suit (ibid.), expanding the role of LCA in European environmental 
policy discourse. 
LCA has also been used in policy discussions and decisions in the 
United States, though it has less impact in the United States than it 
has in the European states. Several U.S. states and municipalities have 
successfully used LCA as a decision support tool (Schenck, 2009). 
Notable among these is the State of California's Office of Pollution 
Prevention and Technology Development, which has conducted a 
series of LCA studies, including the shredder residue assessment 
discussed above, to guide its hazardous waste management policies 
(California Department of Toxic Substance Control). Environmental 
groups such as Green Seal have moved forward in using LCA to frame 
their activities, and businesses commonly use similar assessments 
to lower the environmental and financial burden associated with 
their practices. But achievements of equal scale have not been made 
at the national level in the United States. 
President Clinton's two terms in office witnessed a modest 
but definitive incorporation of life cycle assessment to help guide 
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environmental policy at the national level. Under his leadership, the 
federal government changed its guidelines to allow for the use ofLCA 
in guiding purchasing decisions. A report by the EPA summarizes the 
policy basis for the guidelines: 
In October 1993, President Clinton Signed Executive Order 12873, 
"Federal Acquisition, Recycling, and Waste Prevention," which directs 
Executive Agencies to evaluate the environmental attributes of 
the $200 billion in products and services purchased by the Federal 
government each year. Executive Order 13101 entitled "Greening 
the Government through Waste Prevention, Recycling, and Federal 
Acquisition," signed September 14, 1998, further defines the Federal 
government's preference for "enVironmentally preferable" products 
and services (US EPA, 2000, 1). 
Responding to the opportunity provided by the new federal 
mandates, the EPA developed the Framework for Responsible 
Environmental Decision-Making (FRED), which is "a practical 
methodology to guide environmentally preferable purchasing" 
(ibid.). Many states followed suit, mandating "life cycle analysis" 
considerations be used in purchasing decisions (Lowman, 1997,4). 
Notably, the approach institutionalized in FRED "involves integrating 
price, technical performance and environmental information based 
on LCA into purchasing decisions" (1). Since the development of 
FRED, other government departments have begun using LCA in their 
policies. For example, the United States Forest Service uses LCA to 
make recommendations for design professionals to use reused as 
opposed to virgin wood products (Bergman, 2009). The choice of 
LCA to inform these recommendations was based at least partially 
on the growing acceptance of LCA internationally and domestically 
(ibid.). 
Some argue that on the market-driven basis of this type of 
environmental policy, the use of LCA should be scaled up in U.S. 
environmental policy-making. Schenck argues, "the use of LCA as 
a policy instrument provides many opportunities for rational and 
cost-effective environmental decision-making and can provide 
substantial economic incentives to those organizations embracing 
environmental sustainability as a business strategy" (Schenck, 2009, 
1). Looking at regulations under the Clean Air Act and the National 
Environmental Policy Act alongside other policy arenas, she 
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concludes, "within the US, the broad use of LeA in regulations can 
decrease compliance costs and increase effectiveness ... and its use in 
policy creates many ways for U.S. business to be globally competitive 
(5)." Such arguments demonstrate willingness for more widespread 
adoption of LeA studies and the principles in environmental policy 
debates in the United States. 
However, adopting a more widespread use of LeA in U.S. 
environmental decision- making may not be easily achieved. Like 
most decision-making tools, the uptake of LeA in the political 
realm is affected by the structure of the American policy-making 
environment. In fact, some have argued that the very basis of LeA 
as an environmental indicator makes it incompatible with the 
environmental policy-making system in the United States. Bras-
Klapwijk shows that the "development of the LeA methodology has 
been based, consciously or unconsciously; on a ... normative view 
of sound public policy-making and analysis known as the rational 
theory" (1998, 335). The rational-comprehensive policy-making 
model claims that public policies are determined by the identification 
of targeted goals and an analysis of the optimal way to achieve those 
goals, comparing all available means. It is assumed that policy 
makers will be able to objectively evaluate among alternatives and 
pick the best one (Bras-Klapwijk, 1998). Such a model assumes a 
decision-making context where "The environmental planner is more 
of an apolitical, technical expert, striving to engineer a harmonious 
relationship between nature's and man's works to avoid irreversible 
damage and to secure the long-term viability of ecosystems" 
(Briassoulis, 1989). LeA was crafted with such a process in miud, 
and its success is therefore somewhat dependent ou the presence 
of this type of policy-making. The nature of LeA methodology-its 
quantitative output, compreheusiveness across life cycle stages and 
cumulative impacts across geography-was tailored to guide policy 
makers who operate in a rational public policy setting. However, 
the reality is that the structure of environmental policy-making in 
the United States is incremental, not rational and comprehensive. 
Policy does not advance smoothly toward a clear optimal end 
state. This reality may cause occasional frustration, but the rules of 
environmental decision making necessitate that we consider this 
reality in designing political strategies for environmental issues. 
The Policy-Making Context in the United States 1225 
In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss the nature of the U.S. 
policy-making environment as it relates to life cycle assessment. I 
will focus on the incremental nature of environmental policy-making 
and its deviation from the rational comprehensive model on which 
LeA was created. It is my contention that the U.S. environmental 
policy context must be taken into account when we seek to change 
the underlying methodologies of decision-making tools such as LeA. 
Otherwise, LeA runs the risk of becoming a tool that is increasingly 
analytically sound, yet remains unable to influence environmental 
policy in any meaningful way-or perhaps even makes policy 
outcomes worse (Bras-Klapwijk, 1998). 
The Policy-Making Context in the United States: 
Incrementalism 
The United States policy-making more often resembles a meandering 
series of policy steps than a linear trajectory toward a specific 
policy goal. It can be said that the political setting in which modern 
American environmental policy-making takes place is defined 
primarily by incrementalism (Brulle, 2010, 11; Repetto, 2006). 
Environmental policy progress is not made steadily, but typically 
happens in fits and starts. The reality that the policy advances 
through "piecemeal gradualism" contrasts with the idealized vision 
of the policy-making process that characterizes the rational model of 
environmental politics (Lindblom, '1979). In this model, the outcome 
of environmental policy should be the "selection of the best solution 
that meets objective scientific criteria" (Briassoulis, 1989, 384). 
Life cycle assessment fits nicely into the rational decision model 
because outputs identify a clear environmental winner between a 
set of products or services (Bras-Klapwijk, 1998). The expectation 
is that the results from an LeA will be taken as a factual statement 
of environmental preferability and then used to design an optimal 
environmental policy. However, in American politics, policy decisions 
require crosscutting consensus across ideological lines, and this 
demand for consensus tends to guide policy makers cautiously away 
from environmental damages, rather than toward an agreed-upon 
environmental goal, complicating the seemingly simple process 
of choosing the least environmentally harmful product option 
(Braybrooke & Lindbolm, 1963, 71). Given the disjointed and 
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that LCA as presently practiced has not achieved serious political 
relevance in the United States. 
The structure of the U.S. government in many ways conditions 
~e incremental policy-making approach. Lindblom observes a 
structure of veto powers," both explicit and implicit, which guide 
society toward incremental political moves (1979, 520). The process 
of reconciliatlon between the House and the Senate guides policies 
toward consensus rather than fundamental and structural policy 
reforms (Selin & VanDeveer; 2011, 15). Separation of powers-the 
fact that multiple branches of government are open to challenge or 
obstructenvironmentalpolicies-canalsocontributeincrementaHsm 
(Repetto, 2006, 3). Plus, this type of policy-making suits the needs of 
politlcians, as it allows them to minimize risk by taking small steps in 
reaction to an environmental issue, instead oftaking deliberate, large 
leaps that might marry an individual to a particular issue. Politicians' 
own time horizons are based on the electoral cycle and are much 
shorter than the time horizons over which long-term environmental 
challenges play out, which often causes policies to focus on short-
term, instead oflong-term benefits. As Hammond et al. put it, "Policy 
makers have high career stakes in the success or failure of policies 
for which they are responsible" (Hammond et aI., 1983, 20), and this 
creates an inherent risk-aversion that is embedded into the political 
process. 
However, incrementalism does not in itself preclude the 
passing of effective environmental policies. According to Lindblom, 
"incrementalism in politics is not, in principle, slow moving ... A fast-
moving sequence of small changes can more speedily accomplish 
a drastic alteration of the status quo than can an only infrequent 
major policy change" (1979, 520). His line of reasoning stems from 
the very basis of incremental politics: because it by definition does 
not stray from the existing consensus, incrementalism as a policy 
feature minimizes the polarization and values-based hostility that 
more drastic reforms may stir up. A classic example of the latter 
approach is the current state of U.S. climate change politics, which 
inflames much partisan rhetoric while accomplishing very little on 
the ground. Therefore, though smaller in scope, incremental policy 
outcomes can come about at a relatively consistent pace, which has 
ramifications for our current slate of pressing environmental issues. 
Applying this notion to climate change, Levin et al. (2007) devise 
a strategy that they term "progressive incrementalism." (2007, 11). 
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They seek to upset the current stalemate on climate change policy 
through the implementation of carefully selected, yet incremental 
policies that would counter current practices and "lock-in" more 
sustainable ones. Their strategy hinges on the notion of path-
dependency in policy-making: "The goal of our approach is to identify 
those policies that once enacted are both difficult to reverse, and 
in the most promising cases, become more entrenched over time" 
(13). Therefore, it is false to assume that incrementalism closes off 
the opportunity to address environmental issues in a meaningful 
way. The challenge for the LCA community is to accept the reality 
of incremental policy-making while crafting new environmental 
information that fits into the incremental pattern by insulating itself 
from the perils of partisan politics. 
Non-Incremental Leaps in Policy 
As we saw in the flurry of environmental legislation passed during 
a short period of the 1970s, great environmental policy leaps and 
policy innovation are possible. Braybrooke and Lindblom refer 
to "grand opportunities;' which can often jolt the policy-making 
process out of the pattern of incrementalism. For example, Charles 
O. Jones, writing in 1974, observed thatthe 1970 Clean Air Act was 
an example of a non-incremental leap over previous air quality 
legislation (438-464). In his view, the increase in public concern 
and a change in the public's attitudes regarding air quality created a 
"grand opportunity" for change and for successful problem solving. 
What had been a poorly understood and tentatively addressed 
concern was transformed by media attention and popular awareness 
into a solvable policy problem. While we saw this with the 1970 
clean air legislation, we did not see it in 2010 when the U.S. Senate 
considered enacting climate legislation. 
Certain environmental issues are able to gain enough traction 
to leapfrog the incrementalist status quo. Repetto writes about the 
existence of "positive feedback loops" hidden within the structure 
of environmental policy-making that can interact to shift the system 
away from incrementalism, if only temporarily (2006, 11). The 
presence of these feedback loops gives the policy-making system the 
capacity to allow some environmental policy issues to advance non-
incrementally. Holt and Barkmeyer stress the importance of media 
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in this process, particularly its "vital dual role in agenda setting and 
transmitting information" (2010). If people perceive that a problem 
seriously threatens their welI-being or the welI-being of their 
families, then an environmental issue can become a major factor in 
national politics. But it is not enough for scientists or other experts 
to "know" that the problem looms-the public must witness and 
feel its daily effects, which often requires media attention. Others 
point to positive feedback loops within the political process itself. 
One important theme is the role of "political entrepreneurship" in 
bridging the gap between the public and the policy-making apparatus 
and consolidating these deviations from the incremental standard 
(Lyons, 1999, 290; Repetto, 2006, 11). Referring back to the Clean 
Air Act and other landmark environmental laws of the 1970s, Lyons 
argues that, even as the visibility of issues was rising, the role of 
Senator Edmund Muskie's policy entrepreneurship provided critical 
leadership in transferring the momentum into legislation (1999, 
290). Political entrepreneurship consists of the active mobilization 
of public sentiment on the part of enterprising political figures, 
despite the associated political risks, and helps increase the 
political salience of environmental issues that concern the public. 
Leadership at these critical junctures can become institutionalized 
given the prominence of "bandwagon effects" in American politics 
(Repetto, 2006, 11). Thus, the political process retains the capacity 
to dynamically address certain environmental issues. 
Brulle identifies four main drivers of environmental politics, 
creating a framework with which to consider this dynamic issue: the 
political opportunity structure, the structure of the environmental 
movement, cultural dynamics in relation to environmental issues, 
and mobilization in response to environmental conditions (2010, 
9). While incrementalism may generally inhibit major changes in 
legislation, changes along any of the four dimensions, if sufficiently 
powerful, can restructure the nature of environmental politics in 
relation to that issue. Brulle provides a particularly potent example, 
given the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in japan: "early nuclear 
accidents were virtually unnoted by the mass media and policy 
makers in the 1950s (e.g., the Fermi near disaster), creating no public 
response, but Three Mile Island and Chernobyl stirred considerable 
protest and mobilization in the 1980s. This was due to a reframing of 
nuclear incidents as potentially catastrophic in nature" (2010, 12). 
Despite the presence of incrementalism as a structural attribute of 
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the environmental policy-making context, the relationship between 
America's politics and the environment is far from static and often 
changes on the basis of public interpretation of environmental 
events, 
The notion of "punctuated equilibrium" has emerged as an 
infiuential theoretical model that integrates the incremental and 
non-incremental features of environmental policy-making in the 
United States into one formula. Borrowing from evolutionary 
biology, Baumgartner and jones (1991) adapted the concept and 
applied it to explain the pattern of general stability coupled with 
rapid change evident in many policy areas. Despite the infrequency 
of non-incremental leaps, the authors show, "Often, the grand lines 
of policy may be settled for decades during such critical periods of 
mobilization" (1991, 1044). In this model, the discontinuous breaks 
from incrementalism discussed above serve as "focusing events" or 
as Birkland (cited in BrulIe, 2010) explains, external stresses that 
"change the salience of issues and sometimes replace indicator-based 
analyses with much more emotionalIy charged examples of policy 
failure and the need for reform" (Brulle, 2010, 12). Such events can 
increase the political visibility of an issue and funnel the attention 
of the public and policymakers toward environmental reform, 
disrupting the incrementalist equilibrium. Thus, the punctuated 
equilibrium model focuses on the "interaction of beliefs and values 
concerning a particular poli<;y ... with the existing set of political 
institutions" (Baumgartner & jones, 1991, 1044). This dynamic 
model shows that both incremental progress and non-incremental 
leaps are fundamental components of American environmental 
politics. Understanding the overalI environmental policy-making 
process, including both incremental and non-incremental events, 
will help life cycle-assessment practitioners create LCA ontputs that 
may be more useful in translating environmental data into policy. An 
interesting feature to keep in mind is the one that makes intuitive 
sense but is often ignored by those caught in the environmental 
policy debate: people react much more strongly to events that are 
emotional and personal than ones that are numerical and empirical. 
While this fiies in the face of rational public policy as well as those 
trained in the scientific method, it does allow for creative use of 
environmental information, especially if we consider the scale at 
which environmental issues tend to be felt the strongest. 
r 
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Place-Based Environment Politics: The 
Importance of Scale 
While many of the most challenging environmental problems 
are global or national in scale, the U.S. policy-making system is 
typically not conducive to widespread problems. This is because the 
environmental policy-making system in the United States is place-
based in nature. The United States' political institutions respond 
best when an issue is extremely visible on a local level. Take, for 
example, the overwhelming media and policy responses to the 2010 
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The magnitude of the response to the 
oil spill grew out of the fact that its impact had a direct effect on the 
lives and livelihoods oflocal citizens. Because of this response, plans 
to expand offshore drilling as part of the effort to boost domestic 
energy production were temporarily put on hold. On the other 
end of the spectrum of environmental impacts, we have climate 
change or marine debris, two impacts that affect the entire world's 
population but are less obvious on a local level and therefore don't 
make it onto the agenda. While international topics such as these 
are discussed at length and with increasing frequency in the online 
media, when it comes to real action at the policy level, local issues 
often take precedence. Thus, we witness serious resistance to the 
adoption of climate change legislation in the United States, despite 
the general public consensus in favor of environmental protection. 
It is possible that recognition of climate change as a cause of 
serious local disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina or the increasing 
number of tornados in the South and Midwest, could generate 
momentum behind U.S. national climate change legislation. But this 
attribution is fraught with scientific uncertainty and the politics 
that stem from it, a topic I will discuss at length in the next section. 
It is difficult to overemphasize the power of the place-based 
nature of American environmental politics. Fear of environmental 
damage has resulted in a "not in my backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome 
that "often produces greater total environmental impacts in order 
to avoid lesser effects on a more powerful or better organized local 
constituency." Take, for example, the issue of nuclear waste. After 
the federal government has spent billions of dollars to develop and 
complete a nuclear waste repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, the 
Nevada delegation to the U.S. Congress, vetoed its operation. As I 
wrote for The Huffington Post: 
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The "Not-in-my Backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome is a central element of 
land use politics in communities throughout the United States. While 
it is true that the definition of a noxious facility varies from place to 
place, no one doubts the ability of an American locality to veto a land 
use that they do not like. In New York City we have an extreme version 
of NIMBY where we even have trouble siting big box retailers. Most 
places are happy to allow Wal-Mart, but even before last week, few 
communities were interested in hosting a nuclear power plant The 
strength of anti-nuclear power politics should not be underestimated. 
In New York, people on Long Island are still paying off $3.3 billion in 
debt for a nuclear power plant called Shoreham that, like the Yucca 
Mountain repository, was completed but never opened (Cohen, 
2011). 
There are several explanations for the place-based bias in 
environmental policy. Lyons expects more widespread issues like 
climate change to remain in a state of political stalemate, while 
localized environmental issues like wastewater treatment more 
readily achieve political agenda status and gain traction in terms of 
policy outcomes. According to him, this is because of the structure 
of political benefits that politicians gain by pursuing certain types 
of environmental policies. Lyons explains, "the U.S. political system 
offers to politicians abundant incentive to provide tangible and 
specific policy benefits, yet relatively little incentive to provide 
benefits that are diffuse or intangible:' (1999, 275). By the very 
nature of the functioning of the U.S. government, issues that are 
tangible and local are privileged over widespread ones. 
Providing a different perspective, Selin and VanDeveer look 
at this result more structurally, and with a global perspective, 
highlighting the way multilevel environmental governance, such as 
that in the United States, which includes layers of federal, state, and 
muniCipal governments, gives political space for local actors to take 
the lead on environmental issues. Multilevel governance refers to the 
interaction of "multiple public and private sector actors operating 
across horizontal and vertical levels of social organization and 
jurisdictional authority" (2011, 6). Specific to the multilevel nature 
of climate change governance, the authors identify federal, state, 
and municipal policymakers, private sector leaders, and civil society 
representatives as the key players. Within the system of multilevel 
governance, a country's domestic politics can greatly influence how 
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outcomes are determined (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010, 260). In the 
US, it can he argued that "environmental federalism:' or the division 
of environmental policy-making roles between municipalities, 
states, and the federal government, is a primary characteristic 
of multilevel governance (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011, 12). Such an 
apportionment of roles has arisen primarily due to policy inaction 
at the national level (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011, 12) and can be seen 
as part of an active process of "rescaling" between various tiers of 
the multilevel governance structure (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010). 
Rescaling can be defined as "a shift in the locus, agency, and scope 
of global environmental politics and governance across scales:' and 
often demonstrates that there exists a level of competition between 
various actors at different levels of society for increased power and 
control (Andonova & Mitchell, 2010, 257). As Selin and VanDeveer 
write, in American environmental politics, rescaling is linked 
primarily to competition between the various levels of government: 
"Since its inception, the United States has been home to contentious 
debates and relations between the federal government and state 
governments competing for legal authority and resources" (2011, 
12). This theoretical approach shows that given the scaling down of 
environmental governance in the United States, it is only natural that 
local issues would be responded to more quickly than national or 
global ones. 
The relatively modest political relevance of LeA becomes 
easier to explain when considering that the place-based emphasis 
of U.S. policy-making forms an ingrained and integral aspect of 
environmental policy-making. As I described earlier, LeA as a 
scientific input was designed to provide a holistic and comprehensive 
indicator that could be used in policy debates. Particularly, LeA 
is meant to capture environmental effects that span geographic 
and political boundaries. As we have seen, however, the political 
system is likely to produce policy solutions to local environmental 
problems, but structural constraints preclude the same type of 
consensus around global and widespread problems. Given this 
political context, even if practitioners perfect the ability of LeA to 
capture trans-geographic environmental impacts, it is not expected 
that LeA will become much more effective at influencing the policy 
debate. Instead, it might be more effective for LeA practitioners to 
tailor their studies so as to enable them to specify environmental 
damages at specific geographic scales. This disaggregation would 
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allow the quantified environmental damage to enter a place-based 
dialogue on environmental policy, possibly moving an issue onto the 
non-incremental, transformative track. 
The Role of Uncertainty in U.S. Environmental 
Policy-Making 
The scale of environment problems and the corresponding local, 
state-wide, or regional politics only partially explain the difficulties 
LeA practitioners have encountered in using their outputs to 
influence policy outcomes. The incremental and localized nature 
of environmental policy-making in the United States comprises 
one set of constraints on the use of scientific inputs in policy-
malting discussions. We must also consider the nature of scientific 
information as another important obstacle that hinders the easy 
uptake of indicators such as life cycle assessments. By their very 
nature, environmental processes are complex and intertwined. In 
the real world, these complexities must be simplified in order to 
clarifY the ways human activities influence natural systems. A certain 
degree of uncertainty is a necessary element of any quantitative 
environmental indicator. Science has evolved hand-in-hand with the 
presence of these uncertainties, which explains why; for instance, 
climate models publish their results in terms of probabilities and 
likelihoods-a given climate prediction is deemed to be very likely, 
or somewhat likely, but never certain. While scientific understanding 
accommodates uncertainties, politics and policy-making are less 
ideal venues to incorporate uncertainties into their processes. 
Summarizing the problems this poses for politics, Hammond et al. 
write: 
Scientific statements, particularly projections of the likely future 
impacts of alternative policy options, are ordinarily probabilistic, 
complete (one hopes) with clearly stated confidence limits. Policy 
makers' requests for policy-relevant scientific information can 
seldom, if ever, receive precise, unequivocal answers. Thus, scientific 
information does not mesh well with policy makers' needs to make 
singular, discrete choices. Policy makers frequently find themselves 
in situations analogous to that faced by all of us at times when we 
must decide whether or not to carry an umbrella on a day when the 
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Uncertainty is an intrinsic ingredient in our understanding of any 
scientific problem. The problem of uncertainty is more pronounced 
for environmental issues due to the layers of complexities present 
within ecological systems themselves as well as in how human and 
ecological systems interact. For these types of deeply interconnected 
systems, typical tools like the scientific method are impossible to 
employ because they rely on controlled variables, and there are 
hundreds of uncontrollable and unobservable variables present 
in any environmental system. Since we cannot understand what 
an undisturbed system looks like, quantitative data regarding 
changes 'in disturbed systems typically is inaccurate and fails to 
capture possible variables (Leinfellner, 1990). Furthermore, the 
complexity of environmental problems means simplification is a 
necessary component of any attempt to comprehend environmental 
processes-we move from the solidity of controlled experiments 
to the ambiguity of scientific and mathematical models. Because 
environmental problems are not readily reducible, choices must be 
made in simplifying the systems, even when we use mathematical 
models, and these choices can easily influence the subsequent 
result. As Arrow et al. explain, "We are relatively ignorant concerning 
relationships in ecosystems and are likely to underestimate the list 
of services they provide" (2000, 1402). While some environmental 
problems are scientifically simple, many environmental processes 
are composed of hundreds of reactions and relationships. 
Overlooking even one key relationship could dramatically alter the 
veracity of scientific outputs. Any quantitative measurement meant 
to convey even a portion of the total environmental impact of a man-
made good or service-be it a soda can, a particular emission from 
a factory, or an entire transportation network-must first navigate a 
series of potentially distorting simplifications and assumptions. 
Environmentalscience-andmorespecifically;theindicatorsused 
to demonstrate its findings-is in this way precluded from making 
statements with absolute certainty. Scientific and quantitative tools 
and techniques are constantly evolving and improving but will never 
deliver results completely devoid of ambiguity. It is typical to find 
that when harm cannot be proven, a lack of certainty often inhibits 
environmental protection policy. According to former United States 
EPA Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus, "".EPA's laws often 
assume, indeed demand, a certainty of protection greater than science 
can provide with the current state of knowledge" (1983, 1026). This 
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highlights the importance of uncertainties attached to the proposed 
policies themselves. Because environmental systems are so complex, 
we cannot be 100% certain that a given policy will produce the 
intended effect without any serious side effects. This lack of certainty 
gives ammunition to those who are ideologically or politically 
opposed to environmental regulation. As our understanding of the 
natural world improves and as our mathematical and computational 
capacities increase our ability to model numerous interconnected 
processes and feedback loops, the challenges of uncertainty can be 
lessened. Improvements along these fronts would in turn influence 
how information is used to address environmental issues (Layzer, 
2002,230). A brieflook at climate change policy in the United States 
under President George W. Bush makes the point. During the early 
years of his administration, his top advisers perceived a lack of 
scientific certainty about the scientific basis of global warming. As 
scientific consensus emerged and uncertainty was reduced, the 
government had more incentive to address global warming (Cohen, 
2006,30). Thus, refining the methodological aspects ofLCA to make 
the findings more scientifically robust and less uncertain could 
facilitate the instrumeutal use of LCA in the U.S. environmental 
policy-making debates. 
But as long as uncertainty remains, the scientific problem of 
environmental issues will always be at least partially subjective. 
Subjectivity goes hand-in-hand with simplification in the production 
of environmental information. Importantly; this subjectivity 
exists even if individual scientists adhere stridently by scientific 
and ethical principles. The development of life cycle assessment, 
both methodologically and as a political input, confirms the way 
subjectivity and value systems can alter the results from supposedly 
unbiased environmental indicators. 
Subjectivity is built into the very premise of life cycle 
assessment. Recall the four phases of the standard LCA study: goal 
and scope definition, life cycle inventory analysis, life cycle impact 
assessment, and interpretation. Finnveden (2009) points to three 
sources of uncertainty that reside within these phases: 
• data, e.g., electricity use of a heating boiler, CO2 emissions 
from a coal-fired power plant, and GWP of dinitrogenoxide; 
• choices, e.g., system boundaries, allocation principles, and 
time horizon in Impact Assessment; 
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• relations, e.g., the linear dependence of traveled distance 
on fuel input, the linear dependence of acidification on S02 
emissions, and the discounting formula used for long-term 
impacts (2009, 14). 
Uncertainty within these three sources can create difficulties 
in the transmission of environmental information into the policy-
making world. For example, Cowell et 01. make the case that "LCA 
results can be complicated and may require specialist knowledge for 
their interpretation. It can be difficult, therefore, for nonexperts to 
debate the validity and relevance ofLCA studies in a decision-making 
situation" (2002, 888). In this way, uncertainty and complexity 
impair the ability of politicians to understand scientific outputs, 
given the technicality of the measurement. 
In addition, there exist certain unique types of uncertainty in LCA, 
which necessitate subjective decisions on the part of practitioners, 
such as the decision whether to include water use in an inventory 
analysis (Finnveden, 2000, 231). For issues such as these, the 
importance of choices in LCA analyses increases the prominence of 
subjectivity on the part of practitioners. Finnveden (2000) surveyed 
the inventory analysis phase of various LCA studies and found that 
they typically "do not cover all relevant environmental aspects." As a 
consequence, "No conclusions can be drawn concerning the overall 
preference from an environmental impact perspective of one choice 
over another, simply because all environmental aspects have not 
been included" (Finnveden, 2000, 231). In this way, the selection of 
environmental impacts to measure constitutes a type of subjectivity 
in LCA analyses, limiting their capacity to provide objective policy 
advice. 
The use of differentvalue systems in environmental policy-making 
is inherently problematic. And one of the more challenging aspects 
of LCA is its reliance on value interpretation, which complicates the 
utilization of LCA studies in policy debates. Cowell et al., noting the 
increasing awareness of value judgments within LCA methodology, 
highlight three areas of LCA applications that necessitate value 
judgments on the part of practitioners. Most basically, philosophical 
questions emerge. While "LCA is based on the premise that tradeoffs 
can be made between different environmental impacts," some 
argue that such tradeoffs are in principle not applicable for certain 
irreversible types of environmental damage (Cowell et 01., 2002, 
887). Looking at the interpretation phase ofLCA, the authors find, in 
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line with Finnveden (2000), that this process requires the adoption 
of value judgment about the relative desirability of different types 
of environmental impacts (Cowell et aI., 2002, 888). Lastly, looking 
at the nature of LCA results, they observe, "LCA is not concerned 
with inherently qualitative, subjective aspects" that some may 
consider valuable aspects of the environment (Cowell et 01., 2002, 
888). For example, returning to the LCA impact categories created 
and formalized by the EPA: global warming, stratospheric ozone 
depletion, acidification, photochemical smog, eutrophication, human 
toxicity, ecological toxicity, and resource depletion, the exclusion of 
other potential categories, such as animal welfare, was an inherent 
choice that is in part a value judgment. 
The subjective elements inherent in life cycle assessment could 
comprise a venue for contestation of LeA-based environmental 
information in the political realm. In fact, Bras-Klapwijk (1998) 
shows how the inherent subjectivity of LCA results, when coupled 
with an expectation of quantitative objectivity, can easily lead to·' 
polarization in political debates that can actually result in worse 
policy outcomes. Even when uncertainties are explicitly presented, 
experience ofLCAs in the political realm: 
... shows that political actors suppressed or denied qualifications 
when the results were in line with their view. On the other hand, 
actors tended to emphasize these uncertainties when they did not 
agree with the result. Qualifications in LeAs often led to polarization 
about the quality of the study (Bras-Klapwijk, 1998, 340-341). 
Arguments can always be leveled against the quantitative output 
of an LCA because of the inherent uncertainty of the process. While 
"the result from an LCA is a single observation statement;' subject to 
different outcomes under different parameters, "a statement that one 
product is environmentally preferable to another one is a universal 
statement .. .Anybodywho wants to challenge the results from an LCA 
can always ask for a new situation with slightly different properties 
that were not included in the original calculations" (Finnveden 2000, 
234). 
In this way, the fact that by trying to reduce incredibly complex 
systems into comprehensible pieces inevitably creates a level of 
uncertainty means that by their nature, life cycle assessments 
will necessarily be limited and constrained. Given these potential 
z 
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pitfalls and the possibility of political manipulation, it is necessary 
to consider various ways the U.S. policy-making system copes with 
uncertainty in crafting environmental policies, so as to move LCA 
outputs to better fit into the framework of environmental policy-
making we observe in the world. 
Case Study: Using U.S. Climate Change Politics to 
Explain the Limits of LCA 
The case of climate change politics in the United States provides insight 
into the functioning of the overall system of environmental politics in 
the United States as I have laid out above, and italso highlights the ways 
this political structure inhibits the use of life cycle assessment in the 
surrounding policy debate. Ultimately, the dynamic of climate change 
politics disempowers LCA as currently conceived, by minimizing 
the effectiveness of science-based, rational indicators in policy-
making. This is because the widespread uptake of environmental 
indicators hinges on values and the prevalent discourse with respect 
to the environment, which at present are highly polarized. Climate 
change deniers and opponents with political agendas have framed 
climate policy as zero-sum: claiming that effective climate policy can 
only be pursued at the expense of domestic economic prosperity 
(Cohen, 2006, 109). As a result, we find the debate remains stuck in 
a contentious stalemate, even as polls published in May 2011 by Yale 
and George Mason Universities found that 64% of Americans now 
believe that the planet is warming-an increase from similar polls 
conducted last year (Leiserowitz et al., 2011, 2). But politicization 
has clearly affected the issue, as more Americans believe that 
disagreement rather than consensus among scientists characterizes 
the science that provides evidence of climate change (ibid., 3). This 
kind of public sentiment increasingly mirrors the climate views of 
leading politicians, who project this perceived disagreement into the 
debate around climate change politics. Such views are perplexing, 
considering that scientific consensus is only growing, as evidenced 
by the publication in the journal Science of a letter signed by 255 of 
the world's most distinguished scientists defending the integrity of 
climate science (Gleick et aI., 2010). This situation of politicization 
and polarization explains the lack of transformative politics on this 
issue-confirming Brune's contention that in the presence of severe 
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polarization between the pro- and anti -change communities, potential 
focusing events such as new or improved scientific information will 
still fail to dislodge environmental politics from the incremental 
equilibrium (2010, 12). 
My main argument is that climate change predominates not as a 
scientific issue, but as a political issue. The scientific community has 
commendably enhanced the quality of its work in projecting climate 
impacts of human behaviors. But this development has mostly 
occurred in isolation from the politicS of climate change, which have 
only grown more divisive and should be considered separately from 
the science side of the issue. It is the political element of the issue 
that currently confounds scientists and environmental advocates 
alike. When thinking about environmental problems from a political 
perspective, it becomes clear that the political element explains why 
the numerous LeA studies on climate impacts of various aspects of 
our economy have not influenced the debate in any meaningful way. 
It is not hard to imagine what transformative politics on climate 
change would look like. All countries, especially the most developed 
ones, would cut their greenhouse gas emissions substantially. This 
requires some combination of taxes or disincentives on the use 
of fossil fuels, subsidies to encourage the expansion of renewable 
energy industries, and lifestyle changes. Such changes might require 
a departure from the status quo, that is, from incrementalism. 
Many potential events could have shifted the United States out of 
its deadlock on climate policy, including international mobilization 
around the Kyoto Protocol or the 2009 Copenhagen conference, 
disasters like Hurricane Katrina or the recent tornadoes in the 
American Midwest and South, or new information and science as 
disseminated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
But they haven't. Instead, we see the traditional incremental progress 
on this issue, which defines much of environmental politics; and as is 
common with incremental politics, the result is a meandering type 
of trajectory, defined by contentious politiCS between competing 
interest groups. 
Many of the factors I described in the section on incrementalism 
have combined to give climate politics the disjointed "fits and starts" 
trajectory common to many environmental problems. These include 
electoral cycles and party politics, interest group lobbying, separation 
of powers, ideology, and heightened polarization. Consider the 
contours of U.S. climate change politics over the last 15 years: 
• 
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• In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was enacted at the third meeting 
on the Framework Convention on Climate Change. President 
Clinton agreed that the United States would participate in the 
agreement, which bound countries to emissions reduction 
targets averaging 5.2 percent below 1990 levels (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2002). 
• However, in anticipating of the President's accession, the 
Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Amendment by a vote of 95 to 
o requesting that the United States not enter into any treaty 
requiring reductions that might damage the economy or hold 
developing nations to different commitment standard than 
developed nations. The Kyoto Protocol never reached the 
Senate. 
• As of 2000, despite this inaction, the EPA accepted the fact of 
anthropogenic climate change as part of its official policy (US 
EPA,2000). 
• In 2001, President Bush formally pulled the United States out 
of the Kyoto Protocol. 
• By 2002, he adopted a climate policy related to reducing the 
"greenhouse gas intensity;' or the ratio of greenhouse gas 
emissions to economic output, ofthe U.S. economy. In this way, 
policy on climate change was integrated into economic policy 
and was deemed secondary to economic growth, reflecting 
the power of pro-business lobbying in his administration. No 
specific reduction targets were set. But this policy indicated 
the relevance of climate change to national policy debates 
(Cohen, 2006, 105). 
• In 2003, John McCain and Joseph Lieberman introduced the 
M cCain-Lieberman Stewardship Act, which required domestic, 
mandatory; and economy-wide emission reductions, but the 
bill was defeated by a 55 to 43 vote later that year (Pizer et aI., 
2003,1). Again, the lobbying of energy industry and inflamed 
rhetoric on both sides characterized the politics of this bill 
(Cohen, 2006,114). 
• After a period of Congressional inaction, the election of 
President Obama in 2008 seemed to signal a change in climate 
politics. In 2009, the House of Representatives passed the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act, which promoted 
a clean energy economy and a cap-and-trade system. A year 
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later, the American Power Act was proposed in the Senate 
but failed when Democrats removed all meaningful carbon 
emissions legislation in order to appease Republicans and 
pass the bill (Hulse & Herszenhorn, 2010, 1). The passage of 
sweeping climate change legislation remains one of the main 
unfulfilled promises from Preis dent Obama's campaign. 
• However, advances have been made in terms of climate change 
policy outside the legislative branch of government. In 2007, 
the u.s. Supreme Court voted to require the EPA to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions as air pollutants under the Clean 
Air Act. The EPA is now set to regulate greenhouse gases from 
factories and power plants in a policy that has been under 
development over the past several years. Such measures are 
vehemently opposed by Republicans in the House and Senate, 
who have convened hearings intended to call into question 
the foundations of climate science (Revkin, 2011). 
• In 2009, President Obama used his regulatory authority 
to "significantly increase" fuel efficiency standards for 
automobiles through 2016, with assent from the automotive 
industry. He is preparing to ramp up these standards through 
2025 (Harwood, 2011). 
• In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama set 
down his climate policy outside the framework of legislative 
politics. Though this policy falls short of a climate bill that 
supporters have been advocating, he did set many ambitious 
climate-related goals during the speech, including the 
manufacture and sale of 1 million electric cars in the United 
States by 2015 and the target of producing 80% of the 
nation's energy from clean energy sources by 2035. This shift 
in focus represents an effort to wed environmental policy to 
economic policy and an overall strategy of 21st century global 
competitiveness (Cohen, 2011). 
Clearly, climate change policy has evolved and progressed since 
the Clinton era, but just as clearly; it has yet to make the leap of 
progress at the level of the federal government, and many experts 
feel we need to avert the worst effects of a warming planet. The main 
explanation for this is that climate policy does not mesh well with 
the place-based nature of American environmental politics. Those 
environmental issues with grassroots support, ones that generate 
Q 
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clear, sustained, and visible impacts felt at the local level, are more 
likely to achieve political salience and generate momentum for 
policy solutions. However, climate change is remote and distant, 
and its impacts are imprecise and based on mathematical models 
and projections. The major venue of climate politics is between 
scientists, corporations and politicians, and lobbying elites seasoned 
in Beltway politics. Furthermore, even though it is widely noted that 
comprehensive climate legislation would very likely generate net 
societal benefits outweighing the costs and that the lack of policy 
is harming the U.S. competitiveness internationally, the shift would 
be costly for select industries. The resulting job losses would be felt 
very strongly at the local level in the areas where they are sustained, 
and this issue, especially during a recession, is politically salient. This 
increases the political risks to individual politicians for pursuing 
a climate policy. Another interesting consequence of place-based 
politics on climate change policy is that nuclear energy, formerly 
a clean energy option favored by both President Dbama and many 
RepUblicans, became a political non-starter after the 2011 nuclear 
crisis in Japan, reducing the options for a bipartisan consensus on 
renewable energy. As discussed above, the fear of nuclear catastrophe 
is acute at local levels, and the siting of new plants will be almost 
impossible given local land use politics. Local issues like jobs and 
land use win out over widespread problems like climate change. 
The uncertainty inherent in science also serves to open up climate 
change politics to competing influences, controversy, and debate. 
Climate change projections and attribution, like most science, have 
at least some degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty can then be 
manipulated by those opposed to climate change policy, disputing 
the science while emphasizing the tradeoff between action on 
climate change and economic prosperity. In this way, due to the very 
nature of scientific knowledge, issues at the interface of politics and 
science can always be challenged. The basic psychological impulse to 
suppress or downplay information at odds with one's own political 
views, and to seek out information that confirms those views, is most 
certainly at work in climate change politics. 
The politicization of climate science, which grows out of the 
basic uncertainty of scientific information and the complexity of 
the climate system, has contributed to a polarization around the 
climate change issue. Lacking clear localized effects, the place-based 
preference of our political system renders it difficult for climate 
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change to make the non-incremental leaps we have observed in some 
other environmental policy issues. However, as demonstrated by the 
history of U.S. climate change legislation, the United States has made 
strides on climate change over the past two decades, and it seems 
appropriate to characterize its evolution as a variant of "progressive 
incrementalism." 
Climate change politics in the United States is one of the most 
contentious and ideological issues on the political agenda, with 
powerful interest groups mobilized on either side of the issue. A 
main aspect of the problem is the tradeoff between economic and 
environmental well-being, which is rooted in values. Rein and Schon 
(1993) argue that in this type of policy problem, the issue of framing 
becomes even more important than evidence (1993, 145). In policy 
debates, a frame is "a perspective from which an amorphous ill-
defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on," 
and usually integrates values, theories, and interests of the relevant 
political actors in addition to facts (Rein & SchOn, 1993, 145). The way 
environmental problems like climate change are interpreted, beyond 
the fact of the problem itself, depends very much on an individual's 
setting and worldviews. This interpretation guides the decisions on 
what types of policy solutions (if any) should be adopted in response. 
Going forward, LCA studies would benefit from a more precise 
political understanding of this type of behavior, since it dictates the 
way LCAs are received by policymakers, politicians, and the public. 
A more nuanced appreciation of the interaction between science 
and politics would steer LCA applications away from the pitfalls of 
polarization, and toward a new consensus, however so slight that 
consensus might be. Recall Levin et af.'s pursuit of progressive 
incrementalism. Even if the first step toward climate policy is small, 
if arises out of genuine consensus, it can "lock in" more influential 
action down the road. That will require LCA practitioners to produce 
outputs in a format that anticipates and adapts to the criticisms of 
current detractors. 
The climate science community is now starting to understand 
their role in this process of political action on climate change. A 
recent editorial in Nature (2010) acknowledges that the science 
community is in a "street fight" over climate science, and that, in 
light of the politicization of climate science, "scientists must not be 
so naive as to assume that the data speak for themselves:' (2010, 
141). The editorial goes on to propose an enhanced relationship 
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with the media, including media training and relationships with 
public relations firms (ibid.). This is in line with similar efforts within 
the science community, criticizing the "lack of scientific messaging" 
while calling for the development and implementation of "a serious 
communication strategy" so as "to effectively engage the public 
on this serious issue" (Romm, 2009, 23). Both the politics and the 
science around climate change seem grounded in political realities 
and poised to drive forward despite the current state of polarization 
of the issue. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the way that life cycle assessment 
plays into the environmental policy-making system in the United 
States. As we have seen, the incremental nature of policy-making, 
the place-based structure of the U.S. political system, and the role 
of scientific uncertainty often preclude the successful use of LeA 
in real-world decision making. 1 then showed how climate change 
politics fit into this template of environmental policy-malting in the 
United States. The United States policy-making system does not 
easily respond to a problem such as climate change in a neat, linear, 
and rational format. Climate change as an environmental issue 
is widespread, diffuse, and indistinct, occurring at a future time 
with unknown magnitude. However, the political context in which 
environmental decisions are ultimately made favors issues that have 
clear impacts at distinct local scales. Furthermore, the uncertainties 
in terms of the effect of and the ideal response to climate change have 
created the conditions for highly contentious, partisan, and often 
values-based debates, and we see the median points of either camp 
drifting further and further apart. At times, this no doubt frustrates 
those who seek strong, comprehensive, and forward-seeking action. 
But it has been my contention throughout this chapter that the 
best strategy, for political scientists who are concerned about the 
future health of our planet as well as environmental scientists and 
practitioners, is to accept the constraints posed by the political 
structure and to devise new techniques that can bring about the 
intended outcome while operating within the given political context. 
That is what I suggested to improve LeA, with one major forward 
step being an explicit incorporation of economic considerations. 
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Such a strategy may at first seem like a compromise, but in fact it 
maximizes the chances of ultimate success while focusing the efforts 
of the environmental community toward more productive ends. 
I will conclude the chapter by discussing very briefiy how a new 
and improved type of LeA, built on principles that accept the power 
and meet the requirements of prevailing political systems, could 
potentially begin to shift the environmental discussion in this country 
toward more fruitful ends. Practitioners of life cycle assessment 
must follow the changes within the political world and the climate 
science community and find ways to contribute to a reduced level of 
polarization in order to playa bigger role in climate change policy 
and beyond. So far, the use of scientific information has only further 
polarized the issue of climate change by politicizing the production 
and dissemination of science. But I have argued that progress on this 
issue requires a shared vision of the problem by all political actors. 
Thus, to participate more fully in this debate, LeA practitioners should 
keep this goal in mind and proceed to improve the methodology 'so 
as to enlarge the "formula" or shared definition. In my mind, the only 
way to achieve this is to address the critics and skeptics head-on. 
Perhaps LeA would be more successful if it explicitly incorporated 
economic assessment and demonstrated that environment~friendly 
policies would also be economy-friendly in the long run. I agree 
with Gregory A. Norris's critique of LeA, in which he argues that 
the "traditional separation of life cycle environmental assessment 
from economic analysis has limited the influence and relevance of 
LeA for decision making, and left uncharacterized the important 
relationships and trade-offs between the economic and life cycle 
environmental performance of alternative product design decision 
scenarios" (Norris, 2001, 118). By formalizing and institutionalizing 
economic considerations in LeA studies, LeA practitioners would 
undercut those who assail environmental policy on the grounds of 
it being too costly In this way, advocates and policymakers seeking 
to implement certain environmental policies on the grounds that 
they would lessen greenhouse gas emissions could use LeA with 
economic analysis to justify the policy on economic grounds as well 
as environmental grounds. 
The case of climate change demonstrates the difficulties of 
enacting climate legislation in the U.S. policy-making setting, but it 
also shows how LeA could be adapted to help reduce uncertainty 
and contribute to political action on climate change. In this cbapter, 
2461 Life Cycle Assessment and the U.S. Policy-Making Context 
we have seen that sometimes it is politics, not science, which impairs 
the current state of climate change politics. Ultimately, LeA could 
contribute to a process of reconciliation and consensus building 
between political opponents and in doing so would become very 
instrumental in U.S. climate policy. 
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